http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=15108

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Powell's Dubious Case for War

By Phyllis Bennis, Foreign Policy in Focus February 5, 2003

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security
Council today wasn't likely to win over anyone not already on his side.
He ignored the crucial fact that in the past several days (in Sunday's
New York Times and in his Feb. 4 briefing of UN journalists) Hans Blix
denied key components of Powell's claims.

Blix, who directs the UN inspection team in Iraq, said the UNMOVIC
inspectors have seen "no evidence" of mobile biological weapons labs,
have "no persuasive indications" of Iraq-al Qaeda links, and no evidence
of Iraq hiding and moving material used for Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) either outside or inside Iraq. Dr. Blix also said there was no
evidence of Iraq sending scientists out of the country, of Iraqi
intelligence agents posing as scientists, of UNMOVIC conversations being
monitored, or of UNMOVIC being penetrated.

Further, CIA and FBI officials still believe the Bush administration is
"exaggerating" information to make their political case for war.
Regarding the alleged Iraqi link with al Qaeda, U.S. intelligence
officials told the New York Times, "We just don't think it's there."

The most compelling part of Powell's presentation was his brief ending
section on the purported al Qaeda link with Iraq and on the dangers
posed by the al Zarqawi network. However, he segued disingenuously from
the accurate and frightening information about what the al Zarqawi
network could actually do with biochemical materials to the
not-so-accurate claim about its link with Iraq ­ which is tenuous and
unproven at best.

A key component of the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda link is based on what
Powell said "detainees tell us." That claim must be rejected.

On Dec. 27 the Washington Post reported that U.S. officials had
acknowledged detainees being beaten, roughed up, threatened with torture
by being turned over to officials of countries known to practice even
more severe torture. In such circumstances, nothing a detainee says can
be taken as evidence of truth given that people being beaten or tortured
will say anything to stop the pain. Similarly, the stories of defectors
cannot be relied on alone, as they have a self-interest in exaggerating
their stories and their own involvement to guarantee access to
protection and asylum.

In his conclusion, Powell said, "We wrote 1441 not in order to go to
war, we wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace."

It is certainly at least partially true that the UN resolution was an
effort to "preserve the peace," although it is certainly not true that
the U.S. wrote 1441 to preempt war. Rather, the Bush administration
intended that the resolution would serve as a first step toward war.

Finally, the "even if" rule applies. "Even if" everything Powell said
was true, there is simply not enough evidence for war. There is no
evidence of Iraq posing an imminent threat, no evidence of containment
not working. Powell is asking us to go to war ­ risking the lives of
100,000 Iraqis in the first weeks, hundreds or thousands of U.S. and
other troops, and political and economic chaos ­ because he thinks maybe
in the future Iraq might rebuild its weapons systems and might decide to
deploy weapons or might give those weapons to someone else who use them
against someone we like or give them to someone else who we don't like,
and other such speculation.

Nothing that Powell said should alter the position that we should reject
a war on spec.

Phyllis Bennis is a Middle East analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus and
a senior analyst at the Institute for Policy Studies. Email her at
pbennis@compuserve.com.